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The inauguration of the chair in EU Regulation and Governance at UCD School
of Law, provides an occasion to evaluate developments both in public policy and
academic worlds in which regulatory governance has been a growing
preoccupation.
My topic is regulating everything and my starting point is the observation of the
exponential growth in regulatory agencies, not just in Ireland, but throughout the
industralized world. Regulation today is a solution searching for policy problems.
There is a sense in which governments have delegated powers to independent
and relatively unaccountable bodies and to that extent they are ‘regulating
everything’ - a matter that has attracted considerable adverse comment. It is an
image I sometimes refer to as ‘mega-regulation’.
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I am going to argue that there is more to regulation than agencies and rules. To
do that I am going to introduce the concept of a regulatory regime. Regulatory
regimes are focused on particular domains and issues. Thus there is a regime
regulating safety of food, another for smoking in public places, and a third for the
quality of teaching and research within universities. Though each of these
regimes has at least one form of regulatory agency associated with it in Ireland
there are in each case other organisations with significant regulatory capacity –
1 This title was suggested to me by the work of two of my former LSE colleagues. Mike Power’s The Risk
Management of Everything Power, Michael. 2004. "The Risk Management of Everything." London: Demos.
describes and evaluates the effect of displacing a variety of professional disciplines by risk management,
first in private, and then in public sector organizations. Hugh Collins’ Regulating Contracts offers a highly
original analysis of the law of contract through the lens of regulation which finds contracts to be
simultaneously instruments of and subjects of regulation.
2 I am endebted to John Braithwaite for the story of a senior public servant who told him how
enthusiastically the public service was embracing Braithwaite’s idea as to how regulation might better be
achieved through more sensitive and measured interventions. The same public servant then went on to
introduce Braithwaite’s talk as being about ‘mega-regulation’ when the theme of the day, and of
Braithwaite’s research, was actually meta-regulation (see below).2
and not simply the obvious ministries. Furthermore, to a greater or lesser degree,
behaviour of those regulated in those regimes is shaped only partly by legal
rules, but also by other forms of control.
I will argue that the fragmentation in terms of organisations and forms of control
within regulatory regimes creates a problem involving regulatory agencies NOT
of too much power and too little accountability, but rather the converse – too little
power and too much accountability. Agencies rarely have uninhibited power to
engage in what is sometimes called ‘command and control’. Our expectations of
what regulatory agencies can achieve are likely to be excessive. And whilst their
accountability to the Oireachtas (or Parliament for visitors) may be different, the
interdependence with others within regulatory regimes creates a different,
extended form of accountability (Scott 2000). And, my solution to this is NOT to
give agencies more power and less accountability, but rather to recognise and
work with the various organisations, capacities and forms of control within
particular regulatory regimes to promote learning about how regimes work so to
secure better understanding not only of policy solutions, but also of policy
problems.
So, in this lecture I am first going to examine the evidence of the proliferation of
regulatory agencies, and the evidence is clear. Secondly I am going to discuss
the nature of regulation and regulatory regimes. Then I will examine the variety of
organisations and individuals involved within regulatory regimes and follow. This
is closely linked to variety in the forms of control. I will conclude with an
assessment of the implications of my reconceptualization of regulation. I will
argue that policy processes of regulatory design and reform should be adapted to
accommodate and exploit the potential of many organisations and variety in
control. I will share a little of what I think the contribution of my current research
might be to addressing some of the issues involved.3
The reconceptualization of regulation which I offer in this lecture is centrally
concerned with recognising the impossibility of ‘megaregulation’ – command and
control by regulatory agencies - and substituting a way of thinking about
regulatory regimes which recognises and works with the diverse capacities for
control within them. If we really want to be ‘regulating everything’ then this way of
thinking, which I call ‘metaregulation’, offers a more fruitful way forward.
2. The Growth of Regulatory Agencies
The growth of regulatory agencies has, of course, been an important trend in the
governance of most OECD member states over the past thirty years – distinctive
indicator of the rise of the regulatory state (Majone 1994), and of the
establishment and global diffusion of ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005).
The pattern of growth is linked to a number of distinct trends. Privatization and /or
liberalization of state owned enterprises has frequently been accompanied by the
creation of regulatory agencies, to maintain elements of public control, and to
provide reassurance of independence from government in creating a level-
playing field for new entrants (Scott 1993). In Ireland the imperative for the
establishment of regulatory agencies to accompany liberalizing measures
substantially derived from membership of the EU. More recently the Irish
government has become enamoured of the agency form and used it in domains
where EU measures do not require it. Disenchantment with self-regulation has
led to the displacement of self-regulatory regimes by statutory regimes (Moran
2003). Financial services is a key example and the legal profession may be next
in Ireland. The rise of agencies may also be explained by reference to processes
of policy diffusion as European governments copy from each other and from
longstanding American experience (Levi-Faur 2005). I will mention one other
factor. When governments are short of cash or unwilling to spend it, the creation
of regulatory agencies provides a low cost symbolic commitment to action
(Loughlin and Scott 1997). Rules, after all, are cheap when compared to welfare4
programmes. Recent research has quantified the global trend towards
agencification.
The video shown in the lecture, demonstrates the emergence of agencies in
fifteen key economic and social domains since 1965 in 19 Latin American
Countries, the EU fifteen as they were in 2002, more recent accession states,
US and Canada, the four Asian members of the OECD – Korea, Japan, Australia
and New Zealand, and Iceland and Turkey. At the beginning the United States is
clearly the leader in agency creation. By 2002, as my colleague David Levi-Faur
from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who kindly made this video available to
me, put it, Ireland is the world champion for creation of agencies, surpassing
even the United States, with agencies in 14 of the fifteen policy domains.
I am participating in a research project, led by Dr Niamh Hardiman, funded by
IRCHSS and located within the Geary Institute, which is investigating the
development of central state bodies in Ireland since 1922 and developing
hypotheses about patterns of change observed. The Mapping the Irish State
Project offers more detailed time series data for Ireland, taking all state owned
agencies exercising regulatory functions and very much confirms this view of
proliferation, with continuing growth past the Annus Mirabilis of 2001 in which
nine new agencies were created. Sixteen new ones have emerged even since
then, shown in figure 1.5
Figure 1 Growth of Public Regulatory Agencies in Ireland
This graph does not include non-state bodies which exercise regulatory power
nor does it include ombudsman schemes or local authorities (both local
government and fisheries commissioners and harbour boards) – if it did there
would be more. A recent study by the thinktank TASC concluded that there were
over 450 state agencies in Ireland. An official report published last year identified
215 bodies in Ireland exercising statutory regulatory powers – rule-making or rule
enforcement. This list included not only local government bodies, but also
government ministries. In the Mapping project we have found these two studies
extremely helpful and have built on them as we have sought to clarify some
matters of definition as we have explored the full range of government agencies
in Ireland.6
A significant effect of the proliferation of regulatory agencies has been growth
within the universities of an interdisciplinary field of research and teaching in the
institutions and processes of regulation. Whereas the field is long-established in
the United States, its emergence in the UK has been dated back only to the late
1970s (Daintith 1989). Arguably the field crystallized in the 1990s with the
publication of a wide range of textbooks (Baldwin and Cave 1999; Baldwin, Scott
and Hood 1998; Ogus 1994) and the establishment at LSE in 1995 of the
interdisciplinary MSc Programme in Regulation run between Law, Sociology,
Government and Economics Departments. Whilst numbers of academics working
in the field continue to grow, as do journal article numbers, further stages of
development are indicated by the establishment of the Collaborative Research
Network in Regulation and Governance of the Law and Society Association in
2001 and the Standing Group of the European Consortium on Political Research
on Regulation and Governance in 2005, of chairs in regulation at Sciences Po in
Paris in 2002, and Kings College London, the University of Manchester and UCD
in 2006, and a new interdisciplinary journal, Regulation and Governance in 2007.
Whilst the problem of the growth of regulatory agencies is often presented as
involving delegation of over-extensive powers without proper control and
accountability (Hennessy 2007), my own view is that the phenomenon presents a
more fundamental and opposite problem. In brief the creation of regulatory
agencies creates expectations which, in most cases, they cannot possibly be
expected to fulfil. The paradox of regulatory agencies is that they frequently
possess too much power outside the normal structures of ministerial
responsibility to be legitimate, but too little power to secure the outcomes sought.
The allocation of regulatory power to agencies is accompanied by the
fragmentation of regulatory power in most regimes (Black 2007). Let me explain
my claim that the emergence of agencies involves a fragmentation rather than a
concentration of regulatory power.7
3. Regulatory Regimes: Fragmented Participants and Variety in Control
Governments do not and cannot regulate everything. Even within the total
regimes associated with prisons we have seen recent evidence the control efforts
of prison governors are subverted by the alternative regimes that permit drugs,
mobile phones and birds to be kept by prisoners. Regulating everything occurs
not through discrete agencies applying rules, but rather within regimes. A
regulatory regime is the aggregation of the activities of those whose actions
shape behaviour within a particular set of activities. We may not be able to define
with precision all the organisations and individuals within a regime. What is
important to a regulatory regime is seek an understanding of how regulation –
control – occurs.
A regulatory regime comprises three elements common to systems of control
generally (whether biological, social or economic):
(i) norms, standards or rules,
(ii) mechanisms for monitoring or feedback,
(iii) ways of correcting behaviour which deviates from the norms. (Hood,
Rothstein and Baldwin 2001)
In the human body there is a norm for body temperature of 37 degrees
centigrade (or 98.4 degrees farenheit in old money). There is a series of
feedback or monitoring mechanisms which detect deviations from the norm.
There is then a series of mechanisms for correcting deviations – sweating when
rising above 37, and various responses if temperature falls below, the most
obvious of which is shivering. This is a regulatory regime.
Whereas in the human body the functions of the norm-setting, feedback and
correction are all found in a single organization – the human body – in the world
of social and economic regulation these functions are commonly fragmented.
Fragmentation within regulatory regimes is pervasive even with the classical8
agency model comprising legal rules, monitoring powers and application of
formal sanctions (Scott 2001). Rule making is frequently reserved to legislature
or government ministers under delegated legislation, monitoring assigned by
ministries or agencies, and formal sanctions available only on application to a
court. The United States is exceptional in routinely assigning each of the three
powers - to make rules, to monitor and formally enforce - to independent
agencies. In the UK there have been significant moves in recent years to give
competition and financial services regulators greater power of direct regulatory
enforcement (Black 2007). The best example in Ireland of such direct
empowerment to enforce is in the powers to apply sanctions given to the
Financial Regulator Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland in
2004 (s33 AQ, Central Bank Act 1943).
3 As a brief aside I used to tell people that
there was no mystery to understanding legislation. Having examined the
complexities of the Central Bank Act 1942 and its various amending instruments I
am no longer so confident in that view.
It is significant that where agencies do have powers to apply or seek formal
sanctions research in a wide range of jurisdictions suggests that such powers are
used sparingly. Agencies, in the words of Grabosky and Braithwaite, authors of
the leading Australian enforcement study, are ‘of manners gentle’ (Grabosky and
Braithwaite 1986). The resistance to using legal enforcement powers is largely a
matter of pragmatism, combining a sense of the limited resources and the
potential for eking these out by seeking to educate and advise all but the most
blatant offenders. Where, as is common in Ireland, infractions constitute criminal
offences there is likely to be something of a tension between the orientation of
agencies towards instrumental outcomes, and the orientation of judges towards
the integrity of the legal system. These tensions are well understood by
regulatory agencies which tend to reserve prosecution for a class of cases that
are likely to be approved of by criminal courts. Enforcement steps falling short of
3 Comreg has more limited direct power to issue notices relating to prosecution of summary offences. If
undertakings remedy the matter giving rise to the offence and pay €1500 within 21 days no prosecution will
take place. (s.44 Communications Regulation Act 2002, as amended).9
prosecution have the advantage, from an agency perspective, that as compared
with litigation it enables the enforcement agency to maintain an element of
control over outcomes. Such a sense of control is limited where others have
powers to enforce, as where adversely affected competitors, disappointed
consumers or, as with some EC consumer protection legislation, representative
bodies, such as consumer groups, are entitled to enforce legislation without
reference to the agency. Patterns found in many enforcement agencies are
summarised in the famous enforcement pyramid - a key component of the highly
influential model of ‘responsive regulation’(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) (figure 2)
– within which the main enforcement emphasis is at the base of the pyramid, with
a credible capacity to escalate sanctions if education and advice do not result in
compliance.10
Variety in enforcement practice is explained not only by reference to the
functional imperative of maximizing compliance. Donald Black famously
hypothesised that the stringency with which legal rules were enforced might be
linked to the ‘relational distance’ between enforcer and enforce (Black 1976). The
basic idea is that where these two parties have similar educational and
professional backgrounds, perhaps high frequency of contact and shared sense
of purpose then enforcement is likely to be less stringent than where that
‘relational distance’ is greater. In other words membership of communities may
sometimes trump hierarchy. Grabosky and Braithwaite found evidence to support
the hypothesis in business regulation in Australia (Grabosky and Braithwaite







Figure 2 Example of an Enforcement Pyramid
Adapted from Ayres and Braithwaite 199211
hypotheses in empirical research on regulation of public sector bureaucracies in
the UK (Hood et al. 1999). The hypothesis provides some support for the intuition
that white collar criminals are treated in fundamentally different ways from those
detected committing more ordinary crimes, and is suggestive of a solution within
which relational distance is increased, for example by recruiting regulators from
different walks of life than those they are regulating. The appointment of judges
to inspect prisons is an example of relatively high relational distance
underpinning a regime where, although enforcement powers are fairly minimal,
stringency in naming and shaming those responsible for poor prison standards
(both in the UK and Ireland) has been quite impressive.
It is only comparatively recently that governments have been thought of as
objects of regulation. In research conducted by an LSE team on ‘Regulation
Inside Government’ we found exponential growth in the armies of auditors,
grievance handlers, inspectors and others charged with overseeing public sector
activity in the UK (Hood et al. 1999). It is apparent that there are similar trends in
Ireland, with introduction or expansion in recent years of public regimes for
regulating the public sector in respect of such matters as appointments, value for
money, transparency and domains such as provision of healthcare, education
and prisons. There is, of course, also the economic regulation of commercial
state enterprises such as An Post, currently subject to and EU-driven policy of
liberalization.
This fragmentation is wider than simply mirroring the separation of powers
between legislature, executive and judiciary. Legislative powers are today
frequently exercised by supranational bodies, including but not limited to the key
case of the EU legislature. Whilst there is a temptation to think of supranational
or international regulatory regimes in a manner analogous to classical domestic
models, in fact such regimes are even more prone to fragmentation. In a majority
of regimes with a substantial supranational element, that involvement does not
extend beyond the setting of norms. Even within the most developed of12
supranational regulatory regimes, those associated with the European Union, the
EU element to most regimes involves only the setting of standards which are
then subject to mechanisms of oversight, monitoring and enforcement through
national institutions. In such regimes, of course, the European Commission is
itself a meta-regulator since it has a key role in ensuring national governments
fulfil their obligations to transpose and implement directives. The Commission
has been inventive in bolstering its formal capacity to apply sanctions to member
states for non-compliance with over governance techniques, for example using
competition in the form of a scoreboard showing implementation compliance for
single market measures (Mendrinou 1996).
The more direct regulatory role of the Commission is exceptional, perhaps most
strongly represented in the competition policy area (Majone 1996). Even here
recent modernization reforms introduce a greater element of national competition
authorities in enforcing EU competition rules. Whilst there are hierarchical
mechanisms for coercing members to comply with their Community obligations,
in this and other domains where the Commission is dependent on national
authorities for implementation, there has been an increasing emphasis on the
more community-based methods of steering associated with the development of
networks of national and EU authorities. Such networks have been very
prominent in competition, telecommunications and energy fields. They are part a
wider shift identifiable in EU governance from hierarchical to more community-
based governance, exemplified by the development of the Open Method of
Coordination. I can say no more on this without trespassing on the field of
expertise, and, indeed the inaugural lecture, of my colleague, the Sutherland
Professor of European Law, Imelda Maher (Maher 2002).
The partial nature of EU regulatory regimes is demonstrated by the rather limited
functions of the much-discussed European agencies. The European Commission
currently has 24 Community agencies on its list.
(http://europa.eu/agencies/community_agencies/index_en.htm - last visited 1913
February 2008). The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, based in Dublin is one of these agencies, as is the
European Medicines Evaluation Agency based in London. The European Food
Safety Authority, based in Parma, is chaired by Professor Patrick Wall of UCD.
What is striking about these agencies is how little regulatory power they possess.
Thus EFSA is primarily an advisory body, charged with advising the Commission
on the exercise of powers to make and implement legislation. Even the European
Environment Agency (Copenhagen), is chiefly concerned with collecting
information and giving advice. Two agencies, the Community Plant Variety Office
(Angers) and the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Alicante), do
have legal powers to hand out intellectual property rights. In a geographical
sense these agencies do represent decentralization – and there may be some in
Irish government envious of the track record of the European Commission on
this. However, in governance terms the fact that so little power is given to the
agencies means that they are instruments of consolidation for the central power
of the European Commission (Scott 2005a)
An intriguing development is the introduction of more complete supranational
regulatory regimes based on non-state rather than intergovernmental activity.
Private legislation in the field of technical standards has long been recognized as
important and dates back at least as far as the creation of private national
standards organizations in the UK, Germany, France and the US in the first
quarter of the twentieth century. It is perhaps indicative of the limited
industrialization in twentieth century Ireland, and the concomitant stronger role
for the state in development that the National Standards Authority of Ireland,
established 1996, is a statutory corporation rather than a private body and it
develops standards for matters as diverse as security for cash-in-transit to the
safety of sporting goalposts. Supranational standards institutions have also been
in existence for many decades, of both general character, such as ISO, and more
specific, such as the IEEE, which sets many electrical standards (Hallström
2004). These international bodies are mirrored by non-governmental standard14
setting institutions in the EU, such as the general standards organization, CEN,
the electrical standards body CENELEC, and the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI).
Key examples of the more complete regimes, which involve not only the setting
of norms, but also the generation of mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement
are found in fields such as environmental conservation in logging (the Forest
Stewardship Council) and Fair Trade (Cashore 2002). Donal Casey is currently
working towards a PhD under my supervision investigating the emergence and
legitimacy of the private regime of food standards known as the Global Alliance
for Good Agricultural Practice – GlobalGap. This is no farmers group – it is
dominated by major supermarket chains such as Tesco, Coop, Aldi, Morrisons,
Albert Hiejn and our own Musgraves. The organization sets more stringent
standards than governments as a condition of purchasing contracts and has
systems for verification of compliance.
Distinctly from private standard-setting, the relationships between business and
government in many sectors are such that the meaning of regulatory regimes is
negotiated between them in many instances, rather than determined by the
adjudication of any tribunal or court. Such relationships point to the contingency
of legal rules on bargaining. It has long been recognized in welfare economics
that there are frequently information asymmetries between regulators and those
they are charged with regulating. My ethnographic research on the operation of
the UK telecommunications regime in the mid-1990s observed that dominant
incumbent operator British Telecom shaped both the norms and operation of the
regulatory regime through its overwhelming organisational and informational
resources (Hall, Scott and Hood 2000). Going beyond asymmetries of
information is not so unusual for public regulators to be dependent on firms they
notionally regulate for their view of what is appropriate and feasible, such that the
formal legal power is held by the regulator, but the operation and outcomes
within the regime are determined, often implicitly, by leading firms. This is the15
problem of ‘epistemic dependence’ (Hardwig 1985). There are some domains
where uncertainty is pervasive, and decision making modes based on
assumptions that full information is possible are unsuitable. Nanotechnology
regulation provides a pressing example. I have working with me, on her PhD,
Mary Dobbs who is researching the application of the precautionary principle to
the development of genetically modified organisms. She is particularly interested
in the challenge to Weberian ideal type of rational legal decision making
presented by conditions of uncertainty and the possibility and legitimacy of
institutionalizing an alternative approach based on precaution rather than
knowledge.
Many businesses have powers to regulate the conduct of others, often through
contracts, for example specifying the necessary quality of products to be
supplied. Contracts have become a central instrument through which producers
and retailers seek to enforce ethical norms relating to employment rights and
environmental protection in fields as diverse as the production of footballs and
logging of wood. Insurance companies have substantial regulatory capacity over
businesses, individuals and governments in seeking to curb their risky behaviour
(Ericson, Doyle and Barry 2003). The use of window locks and burglar alarms
has grown largely in response to incentives and requirements set by insurance
companies. More broadly there is a wide range of businesses which have the
capacity but not necessarily the incentive, to regulate or inhibit certain forms of
conduct. A case that has long interested me is that of internet gambling.
Governments and regulatory agencies in the US have struggled to enforce
legislation that makes it an offence to offer internet gambling services from
anywhere in the world to persons located, for example, in New York State. The
then New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer observed that some form of
financial intermediation was required for internet gambling transactions and most
intermediaries, in contrast with the service providers, were established in New
York State or at least within the territory of the US. He also observed that internet
gaming transactions were coded both as internet and gambling, and that the16
financial intermediaries had the capacity to block them. Citibank and Paypal were
amongst the first to accede to requests to block all such transactions in the face
of threats of creative enforcement actions by the State(Scott 2005b). Airlines, of
course, have long been the gatekeeper and enforcer in respect of immigration
laws. Airlines, as private organisations, can do things which might constitute
breaches of treaty obligations were they done by governments or their agencies
(Gilboy 1997).
In some spheres businesses have become de facto regulators of the public
sector. I am intrigued by this inversion of traditional relationships and, having set
out my theoretical position on this in a paper published in the Journal of Law and
Society in 2002 (Scott 2002). I am now engaged in empirical research
investigating one dimension of this – the regulation of local authorities by
insurance companies The scary newspaper headlines which inform this aspect of
the research are of the kind ‘Insurer requires authority to close playground’.
Earlier this month it was reported that Cathedral City of Ripon in the UK had this
year abandoned its annual Shrove Tuesday pancake race following a risk
assessment required by its insurance company (The Guardian 5 February 2008).
Our research, sadly, relates directly neither to playgrounds or pancakes, but
rather the provision and maintenance of roads by local authorities in Ireland
Scotland. My collaborators on this project are Professor Simon Halliday of the
University of Strathclyde School of Law and Mary Shayne, a political scientist,
who is working with us at UCD. It is one of the first projects to be co-funded by
UK and Irish research councils under a bilateral agreement. One aspect of
interest here is that authorities have within their control the intensity of the
relationship with their insurers. Many smaller authorities are fully insured for
public liability with an insurance company. Many larger authorities have
considerable excesses for both single events and aggregate claims in a single
year, to the extent that they do not expect to claim in any given year, unless
some catastrophe strikes. These larger authorities tend to engage in proactive
risk management, whereas the fully insureds are more prone to direct regulation17
of their risky activities by the insurer. In this research we are interested not only
in the effects of contractual relationships, but also tort liability in steering the
conduct of local authorities. Legal research on civil liability has largely focused on
the corrective and redistributive aspects of the tort system. We are investigating
the under-explored regulatory role of negligence liability in respect of local
authorities.
Even central government is far from immune from private regulation. The
activities of credit rating agencies in monitoring sovereign debt are regarded with
increasing importance in finance ministries aware that adverse ratings decisions
will increase their costs of capital. It is telling that soon after the reform of its
fiscal policies in 2001 the Irish government was admonished by the Economic
and Financial Affairs Council of the EU for breaching guidelines within the
stability and growth pact with an expansionary budget, but at the same time
Standard and Poors raised Ireland’s credit rating to AAA and the OECD praised
the overall strategy. Caught between conflicting regulatory regimes the Irish
government implicitly opted to comply with the norms of the private regulator
(competition) and the community of governments within the OECD (Scott 2002).
So, to summarise so far, regulatory regimes involve lots of different kinds of
organisations and individuals. I turn now to the question of how control is
exercised within such regimes.
Just as the ancient Greeks distinguished the governance of the forum, the
marketplace and hearth so contemporary theories of social ordering suggest that
the traditional hierarchical form of governance is one of three essential types –
the other two being variants on competition and community. In the pioneering
works of what is today referred to as social theory the significance of each of
these forms of has an associated theorist: Hierarchy – Government - Hobbes;
Competition – Markets - Smith and Community –Civil Society Rousseau. I am
going to discuss examples of all three modalities of control, and the possibility of18
a fourth, based in design. Key elements and examples of these modalities are









































Table Modalities of Control Source – Adapted from (Lessig 2006); (Hood 1998);
(Murray and Scott 2002)]
In this discussion I am going to work from simple examples drawn from the world
of driver behaviour regulation. Antisocial and dangerous practices in motor
vehicles have been a key target of government regulation of many years – for
example drink-driving, use of hand held mobile phones while driving, parking on
pavements and in cycle lanes.
Criminalization and the application of hierarchy is a key mechanism of controlling
behaviour of drivers.19
Photo 1 Mandatory Cycle Track
Photo 1 shows a mandatory cycle track – it is an offence to cross the white line
or to park in it (Road Traffic (Traffic and Parking) Regulations 1997 SI no
182/1997 reg 14). It is also an offence to park on the pavement (reg 13).
Hierarchy does not appear to be effective on Roebuck Road. Indeed, empirical
observation of the non-enforcement of law is suggestive of customary law
trumping official law – a matter which is difficult to accommodate with
jurisprudential legal theory, but which is much discussed within legal
anthropology, and now adapted to understanding regulatory regimes, particularly
in a transnational context (Snyder 2002; Teubner 2004).
A different approach is offered by some. A press release from Dun Laoghaire-
Rathdown Co Co dated 1 January 2006 appeals to motorists ‘to show fairness,
courtesy and respect by not parking illegally’. Even though the campaign is
supported by the local Garda station there is no mention of hierarchical
enforcement. This is an appeal to community, an attempt to change the social
norms governing the use of motor vehicles. Within communities norms are set
informally, members of the community are involved in monitoring and have
available informal sanctions such as showing disapproval and ostracizing those20
who deviate from the norms. Such practices are not limited to what we ordinarily
think of as community settings, such as villages, but also workplaces and also
amongst firms. Within the Whitehall village of senior civil servants in the UK it has
long been observed that regulation has occurred through informal monitoring and
such community sanctions (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974), although this has been
disrupted by bringing outsiders in. We may hypothesise that within the Dublin
village of senior civil servants and politicians control is exercised at least as much
through such implicit mechanisms as through hierarchical regulation. One of the
most important forms of such community based control is in the form of self-
regulation. Self-regulation, though based in communities of professionals and
firms, is frequently institutionalized. There has long been statutory delegation of
powers to professional bodies to act as self-regulators in Ireland. Such regimes
typically combine elements of community control with more formal and
institutionalized structures, more redolent of hierarchy.
Though guilds as private regulators of their members date back to the middle
ages, trade association models are more recent (Braudel 1982). The Advertising
industry in Ireland is substantially regulated through the self-regulatory codes and
enforcement processes of the Advertising Standards Authority of Ireland and a
similar model was introduced earlier this year for the press, with the
establishment of the Press Council of Ireland and the Press Ombudsman. This
new self-regulatory regime is, of course, overlaid on the long established
community-based regulation based on the Code of Conduct of the National
Union of Journalists. Critically, as one of my students observed in class the other
day, the Press Council regime was established ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ – the
Minister of Justice was and still is threatening legislation if the regime is not
judged effective.
In other contexts parking is controlled through the application of market forces –
applying charges up to the point where the parking spaces available are at or
close to full, but new arrivals can get a space. Actually this technique combines21
market forces with hierarchy. In other contexts an auction might be used to get a
more accurate sense of the value of parking spaces – as it was each term at the
London School of Economics where, in contrast with UCD, there were just a
handful of parking spaces for the whole central London campus.
4
Leaving aside markets, as traditionally conceived, competition also exerts a
steering influence over states, public sector bodies, employees, etc, as they
jockey for position in respect of performance, presentation, etc. The biennial
Public Service Excellence Awards in Ireland is an example of using competition
to promote better public services. An eight page supplement was published in the
Irish Times at the time of last awards in April 2006 to maximise their impact.
Turning to parochial concerns, the regulation of performance in Universities, for
so long dependent on community based structures of peer review, approval and
disapproval, have increasingly been subjected to new pressures to compete, in
particular, for resources, but also for standing. International competition is
reflected in the generation of league tables of which those produced by the
Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the Times Higher Education Supplement are
only the most prominent. There is, of course, widespread criticism of this trends
and its effects, and a search for more subtle bases of comparison (Marginson
and Wende 2007).
Domestically the National Development Plan, the first iteration of which started
life in 2000, has included massive growth in investment in university research,
not only in the sciences, but also in the humanities and social sciences. This
investment is being used to steer universities towards higher quality and higher
impact research through competition for the limited resources available –
gradually reducing block grant while increasing the proportion of funds which
must be bid for. Competition is combined with community in the form of peer
review. A somewhat disapproving study of these trends in the United States
4 The auction mechanism was widely used for the allocation of third generation mobile licenses. Noone in
the UK Treasury could have guessed that the market value of the five UK licenses allocated might be over
£22B.22
describes the reorientation of universities towards Academic Capitalism defined
as ‘the pursuit of market and marketlike activities to generate external revenues’
(Slaughter and Rhoades 2004: 11). Here at UCD, the Vice President for
Research is using competition for fairly modest research funds to engage ever
larger numbers of academic staff in pursuing high quality research and giving
them the experience of applying for and holding grants in a way calculated to
significantly enhance UCD’s overall research performance. This is not
hierarchical control. Noone is required to apply for these grants. Community
regulation comes in here too since it involves peer review and in many, though
perhaps not all, schools warm messages of approval flow to those who are
successful.
What of the situations where hierarchy, competition and community, separately
or together, are deemed inadequate to achieve objectives. Here is a fourth
possibility.
The use of design as an instrument for inhibiting undesirable behaviour has a
long heritage. Bentham saw its potential in his design for the panopticon prison –
with its central tower from which a small number of warders could see and
therefore control large numbers of prisoners in the irradiating wings. The layout
of the Paris boulevards was designed in such a way as to inhibit the mob from
gathering (Scott 1998). If UCD central administration area and lake area were
designed in conformity with this idea during a period of student unrest– and I
could not comment – then it is not the first University I have worked in to exhibit
this form of control through design.
The idea of control through design has considerable prominence in Lawrence
Lessig’s much cited book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Lessig 1999)
and its successor, written by many hands using a wiki Code: Version 2.0 (Lessig
2006). Lessig famously asserts that (software) ‘code is law’ because of the effect
code has in controlling behaviour, often without the controllee knowing they are23
being controlled. In recent research with my law school colleague TJ McIntyre,
he, with me trailing behind, identified the myriad of ways in which internet filtering
may be used to inhibit internet use, and in ways that the enforcement is
automatic and the presence of the control is opaque, with the result that all
responsibility is removed from the user. I admit to indecisiveness on the issue
whether design constitutes a separate fourth modality of control. My current
reservations emerge from engagement with Roger Brownsword’s critique of the
lack of choice associated with design-based control, and a related absence of
accountability for such mechanisms. (Brownsword 2005).
Photo 2 – Parking Bollards
The parking bollards in photo 2 are a little less dramatic in their implications.
They are visible. If we think about it when looking to park a vehicle, we know our
behaviour is being inhibited, and, short of driving a Sherman tank there is not
much to be done. Arguably this form of parking control is over-inclusive, since it
stops people parking even at times where it might not create a hazard, and does
not permit exceptions, for example for emergency vehicles.24
Photo 3 Belt and Braces Approach
Sometime a ‘belt and braces’ or hybrid approach is taken. In photo 3 the
hierarchical authority of law is deployed to prohibit all but cyclists from entering
the road. To make sure, the entry of cars is made a physical impossibility. This
photo is illustrative of a wider argument that these different forms of regulation –
through hierarchy, community, competition and design – frequently operate
together within a regulatory regime rather than in isolation. Businesses subject to
hierarchical regulatory enforcement can also expect to have reputations
damaged with adverse effects for both market performance and community
standing.
The exploration of such hybrid modalities at play reveals that not all regulatory
regimes have hierarchical elements. Internet shoppers are familiar with the risk
that payments will be made and no goods or unsatisfactory goods will be
delivered. One solution is to stick to trusted high profile sellers, placing
dependence on their legal conscientiousness and concerns to protect brand
reputation. Ebay offers a different solution. My guess is that buyers are not able
to depend on either of these factors in most e-bay transactions. Rather they use
the system for rating sellers for each of their transactions.
There is both a community and competition element to the system. The system is
dependent on community members taking the time to review sellers (and not25
taking a free ride) out of a sense of responsibility. The competition element
means it is not impossible to sell with no track record or with poor ratings, but
rather the pool of buyers is smaller, since such sellers will be avoided by the risk
averse buyers, and even the risk lovers will only be willing to pay less, all other
things being equal, than they would with a seller with a stronger track record.
4. What Can We Learn for Design and Reform of Regulation?
I have asked you to reconceptualize regulation – ‘regulating everything’ - as
something that happens within regimes, involving many organisations and
individuals, and a variety of forms of control, sometimes operating alone, but
more commonly in hybrid patterns.
What use is this insight, partly informed by empirical observation, and partly by
theoretical re-classification? Perhaps the most important policy implication is to
suggest that wherever governments are considering a policy problem – be it
unsafe food, passive smoking or poor quality university research – what they are
considering is an existing regime which cannot be swept away and replaced by a
regulatory agency. A more fruitful approach would be to seek to understand
where the capacities lie within the existing regimes, and perhaps to strengthen
those which appear to pull in the right direction and seek to inhibit those that pull
the wrong way. In this way the regulatory reform agenda has the potential to
address issues of regulatory fragmentation in a manner that recognizes both the
limits of governmental capacity and the potential of reconceptualizing regulation
in other ways, for example that invoke non-state actors and alternative
mechanisms to hierarchy.
Regulatory reform has become a major activity for governments, encouraged by
both the OECD and the European Union. Many governments have been caught
between a choice of trying to make classical regulation better – more targeted,26
more consistent, more transparent through regulatory impact analysis – and a
more radical programme which gives fuller consideration to the alternatives to
agencies and rules. The UK Better Regulation Task Force was explicit in
guidance it issued in 2000 that facing a public policy problem decision makers
should first consider doing nothing, and then consider self-regulation of some
kind and, only if less costly alternatives were not viable, plan a more hierarchical
form of intervention (Better Regulation Task Force 2000).
The Irish government’s ‘Better Regulation’ programme scores pretty well both in
its sensitivity to alternatives to regulation and its institutionalisation of alternative
rules and processes within its Regulatory Impact Analysis strategy. Indeed it has
received praise for its ‘multi-instrument, multi-stakeholder’ approach (Radaelli
2007). However the orientation to rules and agencies is difficult to change. The
relatively narrow definition of regulation in the White Paper - primary and
secondary legislation or such rules plus the public authorities responsible for the
regime (p.6) - is, I think, a hindrance to thinking more creatively. Since the
publication in the 2004 White Paper of the self-denying ordinance:
‘The Government will create new sectoral regulators only if the case for a new
regulatory can be clearly demonstrated in light of existing structures.’ (p2).
Thirteen new regulatory agencies have been established, although one of these,
the National Consumer Agency, was a replacement. Ensuring that units involved
in sponsoring regulatory development implement RIA well presents its own
challenges (Radaelli 2004).
Regulatory reform programmes have nowhere led to a substantial reduction in
governmental activity in regulation, nor more importantly, a qualitative change in
the character of regulatory governance. This is because the problem they tackle
is limited to a sense that regulation imposes burdens rather than tackling more
fundamental issues of the limits to the governance capacity of government. The27
analysis I have offered today calls for a more reflexive approach to better
regulation. I suggest that a valuable way to conceive of this, as an overarching
conception, is found in the idea of meta-regulation.
The core idea of meta-regulation is that all social and economic spheres in which
governments or others might have an interest in controlling already have within
them mechanisms of steering – whether through hierarchy, competition,
community, design or some combination thereof. Meta-regulation is sometimes
referred to as the regulation of self-regulation (Parker 2002). I mentioned earlier
a somewhat wider application of the concept to the European Commission in its
role of overseeing implementation of Community law by member states. The first
challenge is to observe and identify, to some approximation, the variety of
mechanisms of regulation at play. The second challenge is to work out ways to
key into those mechanisms to steer them, to the extent they are not already
securing desired outcomes.
In conceiving of meta-regulation as a solution to policy problems my analysis
extends beyond that of Christine Parker and others who see hierarchy as the
main basis for steering the self-regulatory capacity of others. Consistent with my
more general position on modalities of control, the reasons for applying self-
regulatory capacity in particular directions within businesses, within government,
within NGOs, might be because of the hierarchical impositions placed on them by
others, such as governments and legislatures. But just as hierarchy can be
strong in steering in behaviour, so with community and competition. I have been
working in a small way with Martin Dumas, a PhD student at LSE, who has been
engaging both empirically and theoretically with the regime for ensuring that
children are not engaged in the process of manufacturing rugs in India. The
Rugmark scheme, as Martin presents its, is driven by the preferences of some
consumers for reassurance that the production of rugs does not involve
exploitation. This ‘preference for processes’ (Kysar 2004) requires not only rules,28
but also a regime of inspection and certification of compliance. Accordingly it
involves hierarchy, but is driven by the market.
This extended conception of meta-regulation argues for a more modest
conception of hierarchy and is suggestive of regulatory regimes which may
emerge and have effects, but in which no-one is in charge. I acknowledge that
this could be scariest aspect of my discussion for governments, and perhaps for
others. We need to understand better why it is so difficult for governments to
engage in or observe metaregulation. When crises strike it often feels better to
offer a megaregulatory response – this is what happened with the BSE crisis,
Enron and, what may happen with regulation of the solicitors’ profession. It is
interesting to note that in response to a crisis in the medical profession and
widespread concern about self-regulation of the legal profession, the UK
government responded in each case with the establishment of meta-regulatory
bodies to oversee self-regulation – The Council for the Regulation of Health Care
Professionals established by the National Health Service Reform and Health
Care Professions Act 2002 and the Legal Services Board established under the
Legal Services Act 2007 To understand that meta may be more effective than
mega-regulation is challenging.
A suggestive conceptualization which neatly brings together some of the strands
of this discussion is that of nodal governance elaborate by Clifford Shearing with
various research partners (Shearing and Wood 2003). This conception of
regulation does not deny the objectives and instrumental orientation of the key
players, but rather indicates the distributed or decentred character of much
regulatory governance (Black 2001). Better regulation should not be about
regulation and alternatives to regulation, but rather about different forms of
regulation. Everything is regulated, perhaps, but not everything is regulated by
agencies and through rules.29
5. Conclusions
Research in regulation and governance at UCD will contribute to understanding
of both the problems and solutions which I have outlined. Research being
conducted by my team on liability and risk management in roads authorities will
offer insight into one mechanism through which public authorities are regulated. It
will examine the strengths and weaknesses of civil liability as an instrument of
regulation – a key theme in certain strands of law and economics scholarship
(Shavell 1993) and will address both the empirical and normative challenges
associated with having non-state organisations – insurance companies- so
centrally involved in steering the behaviour of public authorities.
In gathering data on the changes in the organisational characteristics of the Irish
central state in the collaborative Mapping project we have been particularly
careful to include not only core public institutions – publicly owned, empowered
by statute and publicly funded. We are already engaging scholars in other
jurisdictions in our attempts to extend the ambit of analysis of public agencies
engaged in regulation to give greater recognition of non-state actors – such as
standards and self-regulatory bodies and those with gate keeping capacity.
At the level of policy the reconceptualization of regulatory governance as
something fragmented, both in terms of actors and modalities of governance,
informs my research on reflexive governance in better regulation processes both
supranationally in the EU and the OECD and nationally – in Australia and the UK,
and also in Ireland. There is clearly further theoretical work to be done on the
implications of embedding non-state actors and alternatives to hierarchy within
policies of regulatory reform.
At least two kinds of networks are central to the success of such research
projects. First it is vital to embed this kind of research into international networks
of scholars addressing similar issues from both theoretical and empirical30
perspectives in other jurisdictions. The annual Law & Society Association
meetings, usually held in North America, typically have eighty or more panels on
regulation and Simon Halliday and I have developed a sub-network specifically
tackling the regulatory effects of civil liability involving US, UK scholars and
ourselves. Early hypotheses from the Mapping project have been presented
within the European Network ‘Connecting Excellence on European Governance’
and will also appear within the European Consortium on Political Research
standing group on Regulation and Governance, meeting in Utrecht later this year
(which is of a similar scale to the LSA collaborative network on Regulation and
Governance). It is equally important to work with the policy makers and
practitioners to elicit their views on what are the important issues, to test
developing hypotheses and get feedback on research findings. We are holding a
stakeholder event in the Mapping project next month to discuss our classification
of public agencies and analysis of trends in growth with representatives from
many parts of the Irish central state. In the roads project we are building a
stakeholder group to include local authorities, insurers, and groups representing
local authority managers, lawyers and risk managers.
I have today argued that if ‘regulating everything’ is to be understood as a trend
towards more agencies and rules governing wider areas of social and economic
life, then it may fairly be criticised, not for generating an excess of unaccountable
regulatory power, but rather because it overstates the possibility of governing
through regulatory agencies and law. I have tried to demonstrate that meta-
regulation – the regulation of self-regulation - provides a better
conceptualization of how governments, but also communities and processes of
competition might steer social and economic activities, and argued that
developing the capacity for better reflection and learning within and outside
government would promote the development of a viable way to conceive of
‘regulating everything’.31
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